If Trump is going to believe what his supporters are saying, then Kim has already won.

One of the saving graces of President Trump’s hasty decision to meet with Kim Jong Un is that he had not publicly at least seemed to believe the idea pushed by his most breathless supporters that he has broken new ground on the North Korea nuclear problem.

Until today.

Apparently miffed at the portrayal of the North Korea summit stuff on “Meet the Press” this morning, Trump lashed out on Twitter.

To be fair, he quickly returned with a caveat:

Despite the flurry of headlines you’ve seen in the past week, and they hyping by the Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea, North Korea has not done anything yet that we haven’t seen before.

They agreed to talk about denuclearization, as they did in the 1990s and mid-2000s, moments that led to arms-for-energy deals that ultimately fell apart amid bad faith on North Korea’s side in the 1990s and difficulties all around in 2008. That is not the same as agreeing to give up their nuclear program.

They offered to halt tests, or freeze them. That is also something that happened prior to, and during, previous diplomatic activities between the U.S. and North Korea (and in the 2000s, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia in the Six-Party process).

There are no other concessions. No change by North Korea in their internal rhetoric. And despite all the media and blather, particularly from Seoul, the regime has made no statement of their intentions, short-, mid-term or long-term.

As if this morning’s tweets after “Meet the Press” weren’t enough, Trump went further on Sunday afternoon by criticizing the analysts — some of who were involved in previous diplomacy with North Korea — for pointing all this out.

So the danger that many people have pointed out — Robert Kelly here, Jung Pak here, Daniel Larison here (just this afternoon) — seems more real today.

It is that Trump will enter a summit with Kim Jong Un and fall prey to Kim’s vague rhetoric, the pressure to appear to do something (abetted by his supporters’ own poor understanding of the history and dangers of dealing with Pyongyang) and his own ignorance and ego. The outcome, rather than advancing the desire of the U.S. to see North Korea give up is nuclear weapons pursuit and open itself to the world, will be that we become stuck in another few years of negotiations that essentially protect the status quo for the Kim regime.

That’s better than armed conflict, but it does nothing to change the big picture.